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 This project discusses the feasibility of using ultrasound to transmit data between 
computer systems, particularly computer systems that have been intentionally cut off 
from traditional networks for increased security. The goal of this project is to provide a 
synthesis of the current research that has been done into the use of ultrasonic data 
transmission, and to conduct a series of tests determining the validity of certain claims 
made in regards to ultrasonic data transmission within the information security 
community. All research, experiments, results, and inferences have been discussed in 
the context of how they relate to the realm of information security. All security concerns 
discovered during the course of this project have been outlined at the end of this paper, 
and potential remediation strategies have been suggested.  
Collaboration Statement 
The experiments and research outlined and discussed within this paper are the 
product of a multi-semester long collaboration between Alexander Edwards and myself. 
This collaboration began in the spring semester of 2015, and was explicitly approved by 
the University Honors Program as well as our supervising professor within the 
Information Security and Assurance program, Dr. Herb Mattord. 
Although the research and experimentation was a cooperative effort, each of our 
papers will be unique in composition, though similar in content due to a shared pool of 
results, research, and resources. Any similarities noted between our papers should be 
attributed to and explained by this collaboration. It is important to note, however, that 
any and all unquantifiable conclusions drawn from the data obtained and the 
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phenomena observed may differ greatly between the two of us due to our varying 
opinions and perspectives. The differences between our interpretations should not be 
viewed as a conflict or as a lack of adherence to the Scientific Method, but rather as a 
byproduct of subjunctive variances in our personal experiences, opinions, and 
viewpoints.  
Introduction 
Ultrasound is all around us. It surrounds us no matter where we are, or what we 
are doing. Yet, we as a species are for the most part ignorant of its presence in our daily 
lives. Much like radio waves, we are unable to sense or perceive ultrasound without the 
aid of technology. However, unlike radio waves, ultrasound is very rarely used for 
practical applications, and it is most certainly discussed far less frequently. 
Most people have heard of ultrasound at some point in their lives, no pun 
intended, yet few are conscious of its presence and effects. Ultrasound, for the most 
part, remains an untapped and unused means of communication. This makes 
ultrasound the ideal medium for a clandestine or non-traditional data transmission 
method. 
Ultrasonic data transmission uses various techniques and technologies to 
establish a means of communication through sound waves outside the range of human 
hearing. Information can then be passed through the air between devices completely 
undetected by any human beings present in the area. 
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This capstone project will focus on the applications of ultrasound in regards to 
data transmission, data exfiltration, and steganography. Over the course of the past 
year, Alex and I have conducted an enormous amount of research in addition to 
performing numerous tests, experiments, and proof-of-concept activities. Through our 
research and our testing, we have learned a tremendous amount about the capabilities 
and potential applications of ultrasonic data transmission within the realm of Information 
Security. This paper will serve as a detailed explanation of our findings, as well as a 
collection of my personal interpretations and opinions.  
Initial Theory Summary and Pre-testing 
Our initial theory when beginning this project was that the modulation of 
ultrasonic sound waves provides both an effective and underused means of transmitting 
data while remaining undetectable by human hearing. This idea was born out of little 
more than a side comment made during lunch one day during a discussion of radio 
wave modulation. After the seed of the idea was planted in our minds, we decided to 
conduct a quick “back-of-napkin” style assessment of the feasibility of transmitting data 
through the air using ultrasonic sound waves. We setup a tone generator and sound 
spectrum analyzer on our respective phones and began testing various frequencies 
from various distances. Once we realized that ultrasound could be generated with the 
average smartphone, and subsequently discovered that an average smartphone was 
also capable of receiving ultrasound using the built-in microphone, we knew we had an 
idea that just might go somewhere.  
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How this paper is organized 
This paper is organized into two primary sections: the Overview, Research, and 
Discussion section and the Experimentation, Results, and Inferences section. The 
former section presents the reader with the preliminary research done before 
conducting any sort of experimentation, while the latter section explains the 
methodology and results of the experiments performed during the course of the 
capstone project. The Overview, Research, and Discussion section also includes brief 
explanations and summarizations of the technical concepts necessary to understand 
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Overview, Research, and Discussion 
Overview of Ultrasound and Potential Applications  
Advertising 
 Up until recently, ultrasound has seen very little practical use in the realm of 
networking and communication. However, a firm known as SilverPush is trying to 
change that. (Waddell, 2015) SilverPush is beginning to use ultrasonic signals 
embedded in television advertisements to track what sort of ad content the user has 
been viewing, and then display targeted ads on other devices owned by the user. This 
sort of persistence has been used in website cookies to display targeted advertisements 
across various domains for years, but the use of ultrasound in this way comes as both a 
surprise, and a rather large privacy concern.  
 Ultrasonic data transmission allows worlds that would have otherwise remained 
separate, such as television and web-browsing, to become heavily integrated with one 
another. By adding persistent cross-device ad tracking to consumer devices, the sheer 
enormity of metadata that can be collected from an individual has skyrocketed. The 
implications of this new application of ultrasound has caused enough concern that the 
FTC held a workshop to discuss the privacy concerns associated with this technology. 
(Center for Democracy & Technology, 2015) If the use of ultrasound continues to 
progress in this direction, the obscurity of ultrasonic data transmission will be shattered. 
Much like the paranoia associated with RFID credit cards, people will begin to purchase 
the “anti-ultrasonic data transmission” devices which will inevitably spring up on the 
market in response to privacy concerns. 




 One of the more inspiring applications of ultrasonic data transmission is the 
creation of ultrasonic mesh networks. The concept of a mesh network is a simple one; 
although one device may only be able to transmit and receive from a short distance, if 
there are a number of devices present, they can relay messages through one another. 
In this way, each device functions like an individual chain in a link of communication.  
Since most all communication devices have some sort of microphone and speaker built-
in, ultrasonic mesh networks are quite feasible. (Hanspach & Goetz, 2014) 
Although mesh nets are not very useful when point-to-point broadband solutions 
are so readily available, they provide an excellent tool for scenarios when normal 
networks are either non-existent or unavailable. For instance, there have been several 
cases in various countries where cell service was shutdown in areas that active protests 
were occurring. Protesters then created Bluetooth mesh networks in order to reestablish 
communication between one another. Ultrasound could also be used as a substitute for, 
or as an addition to existing Bluetooth mesh networks. 
Discrete Paging 
 Another interesting potential application of ultrasonic data transmission is the 
possibility of using existing intercom or other PA-like audio broadcasts to discretely 
page individuals when other conventional networks are unavailable. For instance, 
imagine a concert where thousands of people have been gathered in one small area, 
and cell service is sketchy at best. Ultrasonic signals could be mixed into the concert 
audio as needed to distribute messages to security guards or other stage staff. 
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Behind the Scenes: the Science of Ultrasonic Audio 
Sound Waves  
Ultrasound is merely a term used to describe high frequency sound waves. 
Essentially, ultrasound is the inaudible portion of the sound spectrum. Much like 
ultraviolet light cannot be seen, ultrasound cannot be experienced directly by humans, 
yet as with UV light, the effects of ultrasound can often times be felt rather than 
perceived. However, before ultrasound can be discussed in more depth, it is important 
to understand how sound works in general. 
Sound waves are created by the vibrations of an object. As an object vibrates, it 
creates slight pressure differences in the medium surrounding the object. These 
pressure changes create waves that travel through the surrounding medium. In the case 
of humans, the changes in pressure are then picked up by the eardrum, which are then 
interpreted by the brain as “sound.” The process by which sound is detected by non-
humans is relatively similar. 
Microphones rely on small, thin diaphragms that vibrate at the same frequency 
as the surrounding medium. The diaphragm is surrounded by a coil of wire, which 
vibrates along with the diaphragm as the pressure differences in the air excite the 
device. The movement of the coil within a magnetic field created by a permanent 
magnet generates an electric current that becomes the analog signal suitable for 
interpretation by electronic devices. 
One of the limitations that should become readily apparent is the propagation of 
sound through various mediums. Although air and water provide a decent medium for 
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sound waves to travel through, solid objects do not - this is especially true for 
ultrasound. Take for instance the noise coming from an individual’s next door neighbor 
in an apartment complex. When noise complaints are issued, they are most always 
caused by the presence of loud, thumping bass notes. The reason for this lies in that 
fact that sound waves of lower frequencies propagate better due to the relative ease 
with which they are able to incite vibrations in the objects adjacent to the transmitting 
medium. Conversely, higher frequencies experience far greater difficulty in inciting 
vibrations in other objects. This means that ultrasound is easily stopped by the 
presence of walls or other large objects or obstacles in the surrounding area.  
Modulation  
Modulation is the process of adding data to a given carrier wave. This process 
can be applied to radio waves, sound, and even light. The different types of modulation 
will be discussed in the following Behind the Scenes section, though the basic premise 
will be explained here. Data can be added to a given carrier wave by varying frequency, 
amplitude, phase, pulse, and polarization. These variables can be used individually or in 
combination to add data to a carrier signal. For instance, one could vary the amplitude 
of a wave at a given frequency to signify 1s and 0s in a digital transmission. Conversely, 
one could keep amplitude constant and vary frequency to symbolize 1s and 0s.  
Human Hearing  
The range of human hearing is roughly between 20 and 20,000 hertz. Ultrasound 
is often said to begin above 20,000 Hz, though technically it is defined as inaudible 
sound outside the range of human hearing, which can vary greatly depending on age 
and health. As people get older, they tend to lose their ability to hear higher frequencies. 
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(Smith) This means that ultrasound is less detectable by individuals who might 
recognize its presence. Although an individual might not be able to hear high 
frequencies, they can often discern a certain “feeling” or pressure in their ears. This sort 
of sensation is felt right at the edge of their own range of hearing.  
Background Noise (Environments) 
Ultrasound is incredibly susceptible to background noise and interference from 
many different sources. Fans, wind, and electronics are but a few of the common, but 
frequent sources of spurious ultrasonic emissions. This poses a particular problem 
when trying to use ultrasound around computers since computers themselves generate 
so much ultrasound due to the number of small fans present in their construction. 
(Jiang, 2014) Furthermore, HVAC systems generate large ultrasonic emissions from the 
movement of air through a building. All of these factors degrade the fidelity of ultrasonic 
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Behind the Scenes: Computers and Communication  
Equipment  
Most all electronic devices that are capable of playing or recording sound are 
capable of transmitting and receiving ultrasound – even small devices such as 
cellphones can excel at this. Although one might think special equipment is necessary 
to receive or transmit ultrasound reliability, this could not be farther from the truth. The 
small diaphragms present within the speakers and microphones of devices such as 
cellphones, laptops, and tablets are perfectly suited for transmitting and receiving data 
over ultrasound since the minimum size of the vibrating diaphragm is inversely related 
to the frequency used.  
Modulation Types  
As mentioned in the previous section, modulation is the process of adding data to 
a given carrier wave. Some of the most common forms of modulation used within the 
realm of radio communication are Frequency Shift Keying (FSK), Phase Shift Keying 
(PSK), Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM), and Binary Phase Shift Keying 
(BPSK). There are several other forms of modulation, such as Amplitude Shift Keying 
(ASK) that are much less frequently used and are not within the scope of this project, 
but it is important to be aware of their existence.  
One of the recurring themes within each of these forms of modulation is the 
concept of “shift keying.” The process of shift keying is essentially the process of 
mapping a given variable change to a change in symbol. In FSK transmissions, at least 
two frequencies are used to represent the binary values of 0 and 1. For instance, a 
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transmission at 135 hz might represent a value of 0, and a transmission of 136 hz might 
represent a value of 1. (Multi-Tone FSK for Ultrasonic Communication, 2015) The 
speed at which these frequencies are changed, or modulated, is referred to as baud 
rate. The baud rate of a signal represents the amount of symbol changes per second 
the signal is carrying.  
It is important to note that baud rate is not always equal to data rate, or bit rate. 
The two concepts are often confused, and it is certainly understandable as to why they 
are. In the scenario outlined above, there are two frequencies representing 0s and 1s, 
respectively. Every time the frequency changes, the symbol changes, and therefore the 
bit value changes. Consequently, the bit rate is the same as baud rate. However, if 
multiple symbols are made available, then the amount of bits per symbol change may 
be increased. Consider the table below. 
Frequency Symbol (bit value) 
x + 0 hz 00 
x + 1 hz 01 
x + 2 hz 10 
x + 3 hz 11 
 
In the example above, there are four distinct frequencies mapped to four distinct 
binary values (symbols). This specific combination represents a variant of FSK known 
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as 4FSK. For every change in symbol, two bits of data are transmitted. By adding 
additional signal mappings, the baud rate has been reduced by a factor of two for the 
same bit rate. This concept of increasing the number of bits per symbol is embodied in 
more advanced forms of modulation, such as QAM and BPSK/QPSK. In these forms of 
modulation, the amount of bandwidth is reduced for a given bitrate due to the ability to 
transmit a greater number of bits per symbol. This results in an increased spectral 
efficiency, though not without a price. (Frenzel, 2012) 
The more complex and efficient a mode of modulation is, the greater the impact 
of noise and interference on the signal. As noise increases, the fidelity and reliability of 
the received signal declines. Less efficient forms of modulation, such as FSK, are less 
susceptible to interference and noise. Although the forms of modulation discussed 
above primarily relate to radio waves and transmissions, these forms of modulation are 
also applicable to sound and light.  
Networking (Communication) 
Networking is a broad concept that reaches far beyond the scope of this project, 
but it is integrally important to ultrasonic data transmission. Networking is generally 
broken down into several layers. The OSI model, being one of the most well recognized 
models, provides a standard framework for discussing the various components that 
make the networking of connected devices possible. Ultrasonic data transmission is part 
of the first layer of the OSI model, the physical link layer. Much like other methods of 
physically linking networks, such as wire, radio, and fiber-optics, ultrasonic 
transmissions provide the backbone that supports all of the higher layers necessary to 
facilitate addressable communication between devices.  
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 Since ultrasound provides a low-bandwidth transfer medium subject to noise and 
interference, the networking layers built on top of ultrasound must be lean, minimalistic, 
and ideally self-correcting - current technology does not allow for ultrasound to be used 
in any other manner. Although full TCP/IP-based connections are possible over 
ultrasound, these are rarely a good idea. In fact, light-weight transport protocols such as 
MQTT would prove to be much better suited to ultrasound than the robust protocols 
commonly seen in 802.11 and 802.3-based networks. At the very minimum, stateless 
and connectionless protocols such as UDP should be used when interfacing directly 
with existing computer networks. 
File Embedding, audio compression, and sampling 
In the previous sections, ultrasound has been discussed more like a subset of 
the radio spectrum rather than part of the sound spectrum. One of the beauties of 
ultrasound is that it can be treated as both a radio wave and a sound wave at the same 
time, and have the techniques of each applied to it. For instance, ultrasound can be 
embedded in audio files simply by combining the raw WAV files of the normal audio and 
the ultrasonic audio together. Data can be modulated into a given ultrasonic signal 
before it is combined with another audio file, essentially hiding data in an inaudible 
portion of the resulting audio file.  
Although ultrasound can be embedded in raw wav files, modulated ultrasound 
cannot be reliably embedded in compressed audio such as MP3 audio. This is because 
compression technologies like MP3, Ogg Vorbis, and AAC remove frequencies that 
humans are unable to hear, ultrasound being first among them. Therefore, embedding 
ultrasound is only possible in analog and PCM-sampled digital formats such as WAV 
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files. By using PCM, or Pulse Code Modulation, analog waveforms can be transformed 
into digital formats in a way that the digital representation of the analog waveform is 
essentially identical. This process is known as sampling, and is similar to how curved 
lines are represented on screens that only possess square pixels. By increasing the 
density of square pixels on a screen, curved lines begin to smooth out once the pixel 
density reaches a certain threshold. Sample rate is the counterpart of pixel density in 
regards to audio. As sample rate increases, the curves of the waveform begin to smooth 
out and become more liken to a true analog waveform. 
Security Concepts 
Security in General  
As society becomes increasingly dependent on various information systems, the 
ability to secure these systems and the data present within them becomes increasingly 
important. Security revolves around the ability to maintain the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of data and information. In order to effectively achieve these goals, 
security professionals must focus on blocking potential threats from exploiting 
vulnerabilities at as many levels as possible. Consequently, security professionals are 
beginning to adopt the principle of Defense in Depth, where each portion of an 
information system is hardened to reduce the likelihood of an attack succeeding if one 
or more safeguards fail.  
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“Air gaps”  
One of the most prevalent ideas in information security is that isolating a system 
increases the security of that system, which for the most part is essentially true. If a 
computer or network of computers are placed in a secure area where physical access is 
tightly control, and there is no link to the outside world or the Internet, those computers 
or networks are considered to be highly secured. Areas that demand exceptional 
security measures such as critical infrastructure systems frequently employ these types 
of setups. The industry has coined the term “air gapped” to describe high security 
environments such as these. The term comes from the fact that these high security 
systems are physically separated from the open Internet and consequently the outside 
world - a literal gap of air. Organizations that employ these environments place 
enormous value on the security of their systems, and go to great lengths to ensure that 
these systems remain air gapped. 
During my time spent at the Pentagon, I was able to see a number of the 
safeguards used in air gapped environments first hand. One of the most interesting 
safeguards in place at the Pentagon is the existence of a Faraday cage built into the 
building itself. Faraday cages are essentially containers that prevent radio waves from 
passing through. These containers are created by embedding mesh netting of various 
gauges within the walls of the building itself. These Faraday cages prevent wireless 
signals from escaping the building, and thus ensure that the only communications to 
and from the building go through authorized channels. Additionally, the Pentagon also 
utilizes special glass in all of the windows in the outside ring, or E-ring. The glass is 
designed to prevent light from escaping outside of the building as well as eliminate 
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surface vibrations in order to prevent laser listening devices. In addition, the exterior 
glass is almost a foot thick to withstand extreme forces such as gunfire and explosions.  
Safeguards like those present in the Pentagon help ensure that systems can 
remain truly air gapped, however ultrasound is most likely rarely considered when 
designing high security systems in organizations outside of the Department of Defense. 
Often times simply “cutting the cord” to a system is considered to be sufficient to create 
an effective air gap; soon this sort of mentality will no longer be a viable defense 
strategy. As attackers become increasingly clever in the ways they are able to pivot 
between systems, security professionals must be increasingly mindful of the 
unconventional methods an attacker may choose to use.  
Encryption & Steganography  
Within the realm of information security, confidentiality is a vital concept to the 
protection of data. Encryption hides data from entities that are unauthorized to view it by 
making it mathematically impossible, or at least incredibly difficult, for an unauthorized 
entity to decrypt the encrypted data. Steganography on the other hand aims to maintain 
the confidentiality of data by hiding it rather than securing it. Perhaps the best analogy 
between the two concepts would be locking valuables in an uncrackable safe versus 
hiding them in plain sight.  
Steganography has been used for thousands of years to disguise messages 
within other objects and messages to hide information from prying eyes and mindful 
ears. Since the concept of ultrasonic data transmission is, at its core, an endeavor in 
clandestine communication, steganography is a much more appropriate tool than 
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encryption when using ultrasound to transmit data and establish covert 
communications. By embedding ultrasound in audio recordings, or mixing ultrasonic 
signals in real-time with live audio such as intercom, PA, or other broadcast sources, a 
subtle and relatively unnoticeable means of communication can be established so long 
as no one is specifically looking for it. 
Malware 
Malware is software specifically created to perform a harmful or undesired action, 
and it is extremely prevalent in information systems all over the world - both personal 
and corporate in nature. Malware is a broad category that includes viruses, worms, 
trojans, spyware, adware, and ransomware. Each of these types of malware are 
dangerous in their own right. Some types, such as spyware and adware merely cause a 
nuisance to the end-user and can potentially result in a loss of privacy. However, 
targeted malware such as the Stuxnet worm can be incredibly dangerous, and can 
cause hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of damage.  
Ultrasound provides little benefit to innocuous types of malware that are purely 
interested in information gathering. However for targeted malware, ultrasound provides 
an avenue of communication that is unmonitored and unaffected by any sort of firewall, 
network intrusion detection device, or intrusion prevention devices. This makes 
ultrasound a valuable tool for highly-advanced and highly-specific malware designed for 
a single purpose in mind.  
 
 




Data exfiltration is a huge concern in the realm of information security. 
Corporations stand to lose an enormous amount of money if their intellectual property is 
stolen. Therefore, governments and corporations go to great measures to ensure that 
the possibility of data escaping their networks is as low as possible. Modern security 
appliances such as network intrusion detection and prevent systems have helped 
reduce the probability of an attack succeeding; however these technologies are not 
setup to monitor ultrasonic frequencies. 
One of ultrasound’s greatest strengths is its ability to go where other types of 
signals cannot go using pre-existing hardware. This makes ultrasound the perfect 
candidate for undetected data exfiltration. The major problem with ultrasound is that due 
to the lossy nature of the medium and the exacerbated effects of noise and interference 
on ultrasound itself, the amount of data that can be transferred using ultrasonic data 
transmission is relatively low. As it currently stands, ultrasound is incapable of 
facilitating the transfer of massive quantities of data that are so frequently seen in the 
world of corporate espionage. Ultrasound remains suitable only for limited data 
exfiltration and command and control activities.  
Reported/Suspected Instances of Use 
One of the most interesting and certainly the most sinister reported instances of 
malware using ultrasonic signals is the case of “badBIOS.” Back in 2010, a security 
researcher named Dragos Ruiu began experiencing strange phenomena in his 
laboratory. (Goodin, 2013) He began to notice that machines that were infected with 
malware retained the infection even after installing fresh copies of their operating 
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systems. After isolating the systems from all possible communication sources, including 
the power grid, he was forced to conclude that the devices must be communicating 
using ultrasound. He removed the microphones and speakers from the devices, and 
suddenly the communication between the devices ceased. Originally, many individuals 
within the security community believed this to be a clever Halloween hoax - some 
members of the security community still believe it is a hoax till this day. However, Ruiu 
has staked his reputation on his claims of the existence of malware capable of 
propagating ultrasonically from the BIOS. The code responsible for this alleged 
occurrence has never been observed by anyone else in the wild, and so one is left to 
wonder what the truth really is. (Grimes, 2013) 
 Roughly three years after the initial reported discovery of “badBIOS,” a group of 
security researchers were able to successfully establish ultrasonic communications 
between air gapped systems. Their findings were published in the Journal of 
Communication, and lent some credence to the existence of badBIOS, or a rootkit 
exemplifying similar characteristics as badBIOS. (Hanspach & Goetz, 2014) The 
researchers were able to borrow technologies used for enabling underwater 
communication through sound waves. They also went on to emphasize that 
sophisticated instances of malware could utilize ultrasound to create acoustical mesh 
networks where each infected device functioned as both a transmitter and receiver, 
thereby expanding the overall range of the mesh network. 
During my time at the GhostRedCTF event at Clemson University in South 
Carolina, I had the privilege of attending a closed-door presentation discussing how one 
of the inter-departmental penetration testing teams at General Electric was able to 
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successfully breach the air gap used to protect the control systems of an undisclosed 
power plant. Through social engineering, the team was able to successfully upload 
malicious code containing an ultrasonic listener to an air gapped system. The team was 
then able to initiate command and control functions by utilizing ultrasonic signals over 
the intercom system at the power plant. Of course, there were several other flaws in the 
defense mechanisms in place at the power plant, such as the team being able to gain 
access to non-air gapped internal systems, but the coup de grace was the ability to 
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Experimentation, Results, and Inferences 
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis below was taken directly from the original capstone proposal.  
The modulation of ultrasonic sound waves provides both an effective and 
underused means of covert data transmission capable of maintaining data 
confidentiality and integrity. In addition to the innate qualities of inconspicuous 
propagation possessed by ultrasound, the confidentiality of ultrasonic data transmission 
can further be increased through use of encryption and/or steganography. 
Constraints 
Original expectations 
 When the project was first conceived and presented, Alex and I presented a flow 
chart with an enormous amount of tests to be formed on an even larger amount of 
protocols, hardware configurations, and concept variations. After we conducted more 
research, and began to drill down into the heart of our project, we were forced to ask 
ourselves what we really wanted to accomplish. 
It became readily apparent to us that the scope of our project was still far too 
broad, and we needed to focus on the core concept behind all of the planned tests and 
concept variations. Many of the concepts we originally planned to test, such as the 
interactions between laser microphones and ultrasound, were completely meaningless if 
we could not firmly establish whether or not ultrasound provided both a suitable and 
feasible means of communication in addition to having a profound impact within the 
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realm of information security. Consequently, we decided to focus on determining 
whether or not ultrasound could bridge divide between air gapped systems effectively 
and reliably.   
Additionally, we decided against writing large quantities of custom code to test 
very niche scenarios. Instead, we elected to synthesize freely available and existing 
sources of code, softwares, and commonly available hardware components. The reason 
for this is because we decided that writing custom code for specific scenarios was a 
deviation from the core of the project, and quite frankly our time constraints did not allow 
for it. 
Methods and Materials 
Hardware 
Alex and I used several different devices during our tests: three laptops, and two 
cell phones. Specifically, we used a Dell Latitude 2100 primarily for transmitting 
purposes, a Dell XPS 13 9340 for receiving purposes, and an Early 2011 MacBook Pro 
13 for both transmitting and receiving transmissions. Both of the Dell systems were 
running variants of Ubuntu, while the MacBook was dual-booted between OSX 10.9 and 
Backtrack 5. This provided an incredibly robust environment that was able to leverage 
the open source libraries available on *NIX platforms.  
In regards to cell phones, we used our respective daily-use phones: a OnePlus 
One and a Motorola RAZR HD XT926M.The cell phones were primarily used as 
spectrum analyzers and tone generators. All preliminary testing was done using these 
devices, and provided a suitable baseline for beginning data transmission tests.   
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One of the reasons we decided to use stock hardware rather than custom-built 
transmitting hardware was because we believed this was more within the spirit of the 
project, and represented the closest thing to a real-world scenario we could create. We 
could have easily purchased ultrasonic horn speakers off of Amazon for a relatively 
small sum, and connected them to a suitable amplifier, but this would not have allowed 
for two-way transmission similar to the real-world since one device would be severely 
overpowered compared to the other. We could have also introduced microphones with 
higher sensitivities to ultrasonic frequencies into the mix, but again this would have 
deviated from the core interest of the project. 
Software  
 In regards to software, Alex and I used two pieces of software extensively during 
our testing: GNU Radio and minimodem. GNU Radio is an open source project used 
primarily for rapidly prototyping software defined radio receivers. We used GNU radio 
for the extensive modulation and demodulation libraries it includes by default. After 
configuring the ASLA drivers on our devices, we were able to use our microphones and 
speakers as audio sinks for the raw modulation to be piped directly into. Minimodem is a 
program created by Kamal Mostafa that allows a user to create custom FSK signals 
using almost any combination of frequency, baud rate, and framing protocol. (Mostafa, 
2016) This program was indispensable in conducting our tests and analysis since it 
allowed for rapid testing of new theories and ideas.  
Testing Narrative 
After the initial pretesting for the project, our first real tests began with creating a 
TCP link over ultrasound between two separate laptops. In order to accomplish this, we 
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utilized the prototyping functionality in GNU Radio. This portion of the project was 
heavily inspired by the efforts of Anfractuosity. (Anfractuosity) The GNU Radio flow for 
transmitting was as follows; for receiving the flow was reversed.  
TCP Source -> Packet Encoder -> Modulation -> Carrier wave filter -> Audio output 
 In the experiments conducted by Anfractuosity, 23kHz was used as a carrier 
wave frequency. We had very limited success with this carrier frequency using FSK 
once the laptops were moved more a few inches from one another, and so we decided 
to lower the frequency in large increments until we began to see a noticeable difference 
in signal strength and propagation. In this portion of our tests, we found frequencies 
between 17kHz and 19kHz worked best for our devices, and resulted in a distance of 
around 6-8 feet reliably inside of a heavily crowded room in the Burruss building on 
campus.   
 Due to our success in the first test, we decided to pursue FSK in more depth. We 
had begun to acquire budding suspicions that neither PSK nor QAM modulation would 
function better than FSK for several reasons. First, ultrasound is an incredibly lossy and 
unstable medium. PSK and QAM are much more delicate than FSK, especially QAM. 
Since FSK had such difficulty even with a high amount of resampling, we decided not to 
bother testing PSK. In the testing conducted by Anfractuosity, they noted that they 
experienced very limited success with PSK. Our backgrounds in ham radio supported 
the theory that PSK and QAM as forms of modulation would be unsuitable for this 
project based on the performance seen with FSK.  
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 After determining that FSK should be explored in more depth, we discovered the 
minimodem program created by Kamal Mostafa. (Mostafa, 2016) This program allowed 
us to begin a more formalized method of testing to determine the best frequency, baud 
rate, and framing protocol suited to ultrasonic data transmission. We selected four 
different locations in which to conduct standardized testing: a quiet average room, a 
crowded public space, outdoors nearby a heavily trafficked road, and an active server 
room. We felt that each one of these spaces represented an environment that ultrasonic 
data transmission might take place: an office, a public gathering, an outdoor event, and 
an air gapped server room. 
 Once we had selected several locations, we began searching for the optimal 
general parameters for ultrasonic data transmission in all of these locations. We tested 
frequencies between 17 kHz and 20 kHz since we noticed a sharp fall-off in signal 
quality and signal strength when transmitting over 20 kHz. We believe this was due to 
hardware limitations in the form of integrated low-pass filters that prevent the 
speaker/microphone from wasting energy to generate tones outside of the range of 
human hearing. However, this did not impair the ability of our transmissions to go 
unnoticed by human beings. In fact, no one showed any sign that they were hearing any 
sort of unnatural sounds in any of the locations we tested at.  
 In addition to varying frequency, we experimented with different baud rates and 
framing protocols. We originally began testing with the Baudot character map, which 
was highly successful. However, the issue with the Baudot character map is that it does 
not allow for the transmission of lowercase characters because it only has 5 bits 
available to describe a single character. Since we knew we would eventually pipe the 
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raw output from minimodem into a system shell, we needed case sensitive 
transmissions. Consequently, we switched to the ASCII character map, which uses 8 
bits per character. However, due to the increased amount of symbols required to 
transmit a single ASCII character, we began to see errors in our communication. We 
reduced baud rate in response since reducing baud rate should theoretically increase 
fidelity at the cost of transmission speed. However, decreasing the baud rate increases 
the probability of spurious emissions of interference affecting the transmitted signal. We 
ended up settling on a baud rate of 45, which coincidentally happens to be the exact 
baud rate used in the Radio TeleType standard (RTTY). Historically, RTTY has been 
used by ham radio enthusiasts all over the world to transmit text across low-bandwidth 
connections, so that lent some credence to our choice of baud rate.  
 After we had determined several semi-optimal variables, we used minimodem to 
set up a connection at 18.6 kHz with a 100Hz offset between the space frequency and 
the upper mark frequency using a baud rate of 45 and an ASCII character map. This 
was relatively successful, but we eventually fine-tuned the results using the confidence 
variable within minimodem. The following command was used to configure minimodem: 
minimodem -S 18600 -M 18700 45 --ascii -c 2.5 
The -c flag represents the confidence variable, which is an arbitrary number that 
essentially functions as a squelch control. We tried several values to ensure that we 
could truncate most interference without running the risk of ignoring valid signals that 
were merely weak.  
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With a successful connection now established, we began piping minimodem 
directly into the system shell with the minimodem -S 18600 -M 18700 45 --ascii -c 2.5 -q 
| sh command. This allowed us to run commands on the remote system as if we were 
sitting directly in front of it. We used the cat /etc/passwd command to display the list of 
users on the remote device. We could have used any command, but we chose this 
command arbitrarily simply to demonstrate that commands could be executed 
successfully. 
Alex and I moved on to working on steganography after establishing a working 
command and control connection over ultrasound. Alex had already verified through his 
own experimentation that MP3 compression destroys ultrasonic signals embedded in 
audio files, so we knew would have to use raw WAV files to have any hope of hiding 
data within an audio file ultrasonically.  
We used minimodem to pipe a clean signal of the cat /etc/passwd command to a 
WAV file, and then subsequently spliced that file into an arbitrary audio file. This initial 
test failed to embed any sort of ultrasonic data since the arbitrary audio file was not 
scrubbed of random ultrasonic noise beforehand. After clipping all frequencies over 16 
kHz in the arbitrary audio file using Audacity, we were able to experience varying 
degrees of success in demodulating ultrasonic data out of the resulting audio file.   
Results 
We saw the best results when using FSK modulation, a carrier frequency of 
18.6kHz, a mark frequency of 18.7kz, an ASCII character map, and a baud rate of 45. 
Frequencies below this number can be felt by some human beings, though not 
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necessarily heard. However, frequencies we tested above this number began to 
become less reliable. This is most likely due the limitations of our specific hardware. 
Other devices might behave slightly differently, but 18-19kHz should be usable by 
nearly all devices. The average distance with which ultrasound could be transmitted and 
received reliably in all measured environments was approximately 7-9 feet indoors, and 
6-8 feet outdoors when using stock hardware. 
Our results were not determined using quantitative measurements, but rather on 
a case-by-case basis regarding binary feasibility. If we considered the behavior we were 
seeing to be feasible and usable in the real world, it received a “pass” and we continued 
refining our results based upon that. The parameters outlined above represent the final 
culmination of that methodology.  
The screenshot below shows the debug output from the minimodem for baud 
rates of 45 and 90 at 19.6kHz. The effect of increasing baud rate can be seen in the 
additional gibberish introduced in the text transmissions. Transmissions at 45 baud 
produce clear, error free results, however transmissions at 90 baud produce undesired 
characters.  
 




The following screenshot shows the results of our successful steganography test. 
The window at the top left of the screen shows the debug output of the receiving 
minimodem instance, while the screen on the top right shows the result of the command 
embedded ultrasonically in the recording of the arbitrary audio file, Sandstorm by 
Darude. The window at the bottom right of the screen shows the computer’s media 
player playing the audio file over the computer's speakers; the ultrasonic signals are 
then being picked up by the computer’s microphone. The setup could have just as 
easily been split up over two computers. 




All of the following graphs were created by using the Spectrum Analyzer on the 
OnePlus One device. The optimally determined frequency stated above was used in all 
of tests represented in the graphs to ensure that the environmental effects of the 
various locations could be accurately accessed. The X axis represents frequency, and 
the Y axis represents signal strength in decibels. It is important to note that a change of 
-3dB is equivalent to the strength of the signal being cut in half. Values in green 
represent the sound levels at the time the graph was recorded, whereas values in red 
represent the peak values. The values in red should be disregarded since they are often 
created by simply punching a button on the device.  
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Dorm Noise Floor (LEFT) and Dorm + Ultrasonic Signal (RIGHT) 
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Dorm + Ultrasonic Signal + Music 
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Outdoor Noise Floor (LEFT) and Outdoor + Ultrasonic Signal (RIGHT) 
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Outdoor + Ultrasonic Signal + Music 
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Server Room Noise Floor (LEFT) and Server Room + Ultrasonic Signal (RIGHT) 
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Server Room + Ultrasonic Signal + Music 
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Commons Noise Floor (LEFT) and Commons + Ultrasonic Signal (RIGHT) 
 z      
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Ultrasonic data transmission is indeed possible, and can be used to transfer data 
with both confidentiality and integrity. Ultrasonic data steganography is also possible 
and can be used to achieve the same end goals as ultrasonic data transmission through 
different means. Additionally, both of these concepts have relevance and a potentially 
profound impact on the realm of information security.  
Through the use of ultrasonic data transmission, it is possible to bridge the divide 
created between air gapped systems, thus creating a threat to the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the data contained on the air gapped systems.  
Physical Limits  
Although both ultrasonic data transmission and steganography are possible, they 
are not without their limits. Based on our testing, ultrasound does not propagate well 
past 6-9 feet when using stock hardware that has not been specifically designed to work 
with ultrasound. Even if better hardware was introduced in an effort to increase this 
distance, the physical limitations of high frequency transmissions still apply. It takes 
much more energy for a high frequency wave to propagate as far as a low frequency 
wave - the laws of physics cannot be changed.  
Furthermore, ultrasound will not propagate through solid objects unless the 
source is placed directly on the solid object itself. Walls and other large obstacles 
represent near impenetrable boundaries for ultrasound in this portion of the spectrum. 
 
 




 Despite the fact that ultrasound is capable of bridging the divide between air 
gapped systems as a communications protocol it still requires a listener to be setup on 
the air gapped system. The only way to get the listening on the air gapped system is 
through physical means at that point. So in essence, ultrasonic data transmission only 
allows an attacker to maintain persistence in an air gapped system, not obtain access to 
it. Assuming the physical security of the system is maintained, the likelihood of 
ultrasonic data transmission being useful is slim.  
 In regards to ultrasonic data steganography, file compression is a death 
sentence for the embedded ultrasonic data. If ultrasound is intended to be hidden in an 
audio file, the audio file must remain in a raw, PCM-sampled format. Common 
compression technologies such as MP3, Ogg Vorbis, and AAC will remove any and all 
traces of ultrasonic signals in a given recording.  
Security Considerations and Recommendations 
In order to prevent attackers from utilizing ultrasound to compromise air gapped 
systems, effective security considerations must be made and appropriate safeguards 
put in place.  
  Removal of microphone and speaker 
 The simplest and surest way to prevent ultrasound from being used to establish a 
link to air gapped systems is to remove the hardware that makes the transmission of 
ultrasound possible. If the microphone and speaker are removed from a system, there is 
no way for it to utilize ultrasonic data transmission. If no reason exists for having the 
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microphone or speaker, this is the best course of prevention. Essentially, this is the 
concept of least privilege being applied to hardware instead of user-roles.  
Heuristics  
 Assuming that removing the microphone or speaker is not feasible for some 
reason, the next best thing would be to provide any sort of anti-virus or HIDPS services 
running on the air gapped system with the necessary signatures or heuristic algorithms 
necessary to discover processes passing modulated data to the default sound and 
recording devices on the system. This sort of safeguard would most likely cause issues 
with audio editing software as well as potentially some drivers. However, an application 
whitelist would solve those issues. Considering the system would already be air 
gapped, it stands to reason that a software whitelist is already in place; therefore a new 
whitelist would not have to be established.    
Extrapolations  
 Now knowing that ultrasonic data transmission is a viable concept, there are 
several potential next steps to undertake. The following concepts could become an 
expansion on this work, and become full-fledged projects in their own right.  
 Laser Microphones and Ultrasound 
 Laser microphones are actually incredibly simple. They project a laser beam onto 
a window, and a camera measures the movement in the reflection of the laser beam. 
When the laser is projected onto a glass window, the sound in the room causes the 
glass to vibrate, and the laser to be reflected at slightly different angles. It is unknown 
whether or not ultrasound possesses the ability to vibrate the types of glass commonly 
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used in windows. In order for ultrasound to excite measurable vibrations in the glass, it 
would require a much stronger ultrasonic speaker than is present in stock devices.  
Power line Signal Modulators and Ultrasound 
 Power line adapters are not new. In fact, modulation over power lines is possible 
for both analog and digital signals. Although many high security systems use filters to 
ensure that power lines cannot carry modulated data, they may be able to be bypassed 
by signals modulated ultrasonically. Again, this is unknown and would need to be 
tested. 
Wall Transducers and Infrasound 
 On the complete opposite end of the spectrum exists the concept of infrasound, 
or sounds so low that humans are unable to hear them. These sounds are essentially 
nothing but vibrations that can be felt rather than heard, and they exist below 20 Hz. 
Since low frequencies propagate so well through solid objects, special bass transducers 
could potentially be used to exfiltrate data from a building using the same modulation 
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